On being balanced in an unbalanced world by Skitmore, Martin & Cattell, David
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Skitmore, M. & Cattell, D (2012) On being balanced in an unbalanced
world. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 64(1), pp. 138-146.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/56153/
c© Copyright 2012 Palgrave Macmillan
Author’s Pre-print: author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing)
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jors.2012.29
On being balanced in an unbalanced world 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the case of a procurement auction for a single project, in which the 
breakdown of the winning bid into its component items determines the value of payments 
subsequently made to bidder as the work progresses.  Unbalanced bidding, or bid skewing, 
involves the uneven distribution of mark-up among the component items in such a way as to 
attempt to derive increased benefit to the unbalancer but without involving any change in the 
total bid.  One form of unbalanced bidding for example, termed Front Loading (FL), is thought 
to be widespread in practice.  This involves overpricing the work items that occur early in the 
project and underpricing the work items that occur later in the project in order to enhance the 
bidder’s cash flow.  Naturally, auctioners attempt to protect themselves from the effects of 
unbalancing - typically reserving the right to reject a bid that has been detected as unbalanced.  
As a result, models have been developed to both unbalance bids and detect unbalanced bids but 
virtually nothing is known of their use, success or otherwise.  This is of particular concern for the 
detection methods as, without testing, there is no way of knowing the extent to which unbalanced 
bids are remaining undetected or balanced bids are being falsely detected as unbalanced. 
 
This paper reports on a simulation study aimed at demonstrating the likely effects of unbalanced 
bid detection models in a deterministic environment involving FL unbalancing in a Texas DOT 
detection setting, in which bids are deemed to be unbalanced if an item exceeds a maximum (or 
fails to reach a minimum) “cut-off” value determined by the Texas method.  A proportion of bids 
are automatically and maximally unbalanced over a long series of simulated contract projects 
and the profits and detection rates of both the balancers and unbalancers are compared. 
 
The results show that, as expected, the balanced bids are often incorrectly detected as 
unbalanced, with the rate of (mis)detection increasing with the proportion of FL bidders in the 
auction.  It is also shown that, while the profit for balanced bidders remains the same irrespective 
of the number of FL bidders involved, the FL bidder’s profit increases with the greater 
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proportion of FL bidders present in the auction.  Sensitivity tests show the results to be generally 
robust, with (mis)detection rates increasing further when there are fewer bidders in the auction 
and when more data is averaged to determine the baseline value, but being smaller or larger with 
increased cut-off values and increased cost and estimate variability depending on the number of 
FL bidders involved.  The FL bidder’s expected benefit from unbalancing, on the other hand, 
increases when there are fewer bidders in the auction.  It also increases when the cut-off rate and 
discount rate is increased, and when there is less variability in the costs and their estimates, and 
when less data is used in setting the baseline values. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
This paper examines the case of a procurement auction for a single project, in which the 
breakdown of the winning bid into its component items determines the value of payments 
subsequently made to the bidder as the work progresses.  Unbalanced bidding, or bid skewing as 
it is sometimes termed in the case of timber-sale auctions (e.g.,, Rothkopf & Harstad 1994; 
Athey & Levin 2001; Haley & Dunphey 2010), involves the uneven distribution of mark-up 
among a bid’s component items in such a way as to attempt to derive increased benefit to the 
unbalanced bidder but without involving any change in the total tender price1. It contributes to 
efficient resource utilization and ultimately benefits clients “… since it helps to ensure that the 
most efficient constructor constructs” (Stark 1974:377).  Amongst other things, it offers an 
important means of reducing the contractor’s debt incurred in providing resources in advance of 
‘in-progress’ payments from the client/owner, as this can be substantial2 (Kenley, 2003). 
 
Its use appears to be ubiquitous.  As far back as 1935, unbalanced bidding was reported to be 
“frequently practiced” although “much less flagrantly” than before 1920! (Chawner 1935: 576).  
By 1974, unbalancing was said to be “virtually universal” (Stark 1974: 377) and since then 
“common” (Clough & Sears 1994; Hinze 1993).  Most recently, unbalanced bidding is thought to 
                                                 
1 Following Stark (1974: 373) these terms are used interchangeably: bidding, tendering; unit price, unit bid, bill rate; 
bidder, contractor; auctioner, seller, owner, client, sponsor; Unit Price Proposal, Bill of Quantities; unbalancing, 
loading of bill rates; front loading, front end loading. 
2 As Stark notes, some construction projects, such as highways and maintenance are “more a challenge of finance 
than of technology” (Stark 1974:375) 
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be “the most widely used tactic” for making the bid price more competitive ahead of unexpected 
markdown, loss-first-profit-later quotation, multiple alternative quotations, etc. (Liu et al 2009: 
188). 
 
One of the various alternative forms of unbalancing is “back-end loading”, which involves 
applying relatively high prices for items scheduled for late completion, and particularly those 
items that are expected to have a high rate of inflation, and proportionately lower prices for other 
items, in order to gain extra payments where compensation of inflation is being awarded (Cattell, 
1987).  Another is “Front loading” (FL), which involves apportioning relatively high prices to 
items scheduled for early completion and proportionately lower prices for other items in order to 
improve cash flow in the early stages of the project. FL is considered to be the most common 
type of unbalancing (Arditi & Chotibhong 2009: 721; Christodoulou 2008: 1293), with Stark 
(1974) claiming it is used in “virtually every tender”.   
 
The practice of FL comes as a likely added cost to clients.  If it succeeds in producing an 
improved cash flow for the bidder, this comes at the expense of a worse cash flow for the client.  
Furthermore, besides having to pay the bidder sooner than would otherwise be necessary, the 
client is also having to take the risk that the bidder will not default mid-way through the project.  
If that were to happen, the client will be left with a situation where they will have overpaid for 
the interim work that will have been done and therefore unlikely to find another bidder willing to 
complete the project for the amount left over. 
 
However, there is little empirical evidence for these claims.  Stark’s experience is limited to just 
one major UK construction company.  Only Green (1986) has attempted to survey the field – 
with a series of interviews involving three contractors and three consultants – finding that two of 
the contractors used FL and “considered the practice [of unbalancing] to be widespread, contrary 
to the consultant’s views” (Tong & Lu 1992: 70).  It should be said of course, that the lack of 
evidence is unsurprising, with FL (and unbalancing in general) thought by many to be an 
unethical practice (e.g., Arditi & Chotibhong 2009). 
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According to Stark (1974), FL in practice is often “neither competent nor conscious”, and several 
models have been presented as a means of systemising the process. Gates (1959, 1967) seems to 
have been the first to set out the steps involved, followed by Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) 
reformulation as a linear program - claimed to be automatic as “the solutions to the appropriate 
linear programs simply are not within the unaided human capacity” (Stark 1974: 387).  Later 
Doersch & Patterson (1977), Ashley & Teicholz (1977) and Tong and Lu (1992) propose 
different versions of Stark’s original deterministic model, with Diekmann et al (1982), Cattell 
(1984, 1987), Christodoulou (2008), Afshar and Amiri (2008) and Liu (2009) developing non-
deterministic alternatives.  Also, Cattell et al (2008) have shown that FL models can be 
significantly simplified by having the objective of maximizing a project’s top-line revenue rather 
than maximizing bottom-line profit.  A test done on a hypothetical project by Cattell (2009) 
indicated significant benefits, in terms of increased profits without necessarily increased risks.  
However, no empirical tests of these models have been reported as yet and it is recommended 
that contractors should use sensitivity analysis to assess their robustness (Stark 1974: 5).  
 
Of course, FL is not without its risks.  Clients typically perceive unbalanced bids as being more 
costly to them.  The main concern for the bidder is that the bid may be deemed ineligible.  A 
situation reported in Taiwan is that the bidder is asked to explain unbalanced-looking bids with a 
view to a negotiated adjustment (Wang 2004).  Typical UK practice is similar, with the client 
often reserving the right not to accept the lowest or any bid.  In other cases, a “blatantly 
unbalanced” bid may be refused (Doersch & Patterson 1977: 883).  USA practice seems to be 
dominated by the various federal and state ‘regulations’, where “irregular” bids such as those 
that are FL can be disqualified or rejected (Stark, 1974; Christodoulou 2008; Arditi & 
Chotibhong 2009). The California Department of Transport (CalTran), for example, have 
recently been reported as awarding four percent of their contracts to other than the lowest bidder 
and, according to industry sources, most likely due to unbalanced bids (Bajari et al 2006: 9).  
CalTran may also insist on renegotiating unit prices and are considering the possibility of a more 
flexible penalty function (Bajari et al 2006: 9). 
 
Correctly applying these penalties, however, relies on the accurate detection of unbalanced bids 
by the client but, as has been noted, “... very few researchers have explored the ways of 
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preventing unbalanced bids” (Arditi & Chotibhong 2009: 271).  Current UK practice is for a 
consultant (quantity surveyor) to “look at the item prices to see if they are free from arithmetic 
error, reasonable (with respect to conformity with industry standards) and not likely to distort the 
contract in a manner that is to the client’s disadvantage” (Cattell 1984: 7).  The practice in the 
British Commonwealth countries is similar.  One major quantity surveying practice in Hong 
Kong, for example, regularly assesses unit prices for the lowest overall bid by comparing them 
with the unit prices for the lowest three competing bids (Cheung 2010). 
 
A survey of USA practice in detecting unbalanced highway construction bids was conducted in 
2004 by the American Association of Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and 
summarised in Arditi & Chotibhong (2009).  Many of the state departments of transport (DOTs) 
involved attempt to identify unbalanced bids without any formal procedures.  Those with formal 
procedures use either an “engineer’s estimate” or average of unit prices as a baseline figure from 
which to judge individual unit prices.  “Irregular bids” are then determined by their distance from 
this baseline by a variety of percentage “cut-offs” (in which an item exceeds a maximum, or fails 
to reach a minimum, value determined by the detection method) and formulae used. 
 
Wang (2004) and Arditi & Chotibhong (2009) have attempted to “automate the process” 
involved in detecting unbalanced bids.  Wang’s procedure is aligned to the Taiwan system, 
termed the owner-based approach, where the baseline unit rates are provided by the owner – 
adjusted by the lowest bid/owner total ratio (discounting ratio) “employed under the belief that 
the owner’s cost estimate is more reasonable than the bidder because his cost estimate is more 
thoroughly prepared by the architect” (Wang 2004: 455).  This is then embodied in a spreadsheet 
to identify unit prices exceeding ±30% of the owner’s rates.  Arditi & Chotibhong (2009) 
procedure is also based on a spreadsheet and follows the USA approach by identifying unit 
prices exceeding a similar percentage difference to the engineer’s estimate/average bid baseline 
value.  Although they claim the model to be “fully automated”, it does still require some input in 
order to operate in addition to the bidders’ data.  That is, an approximate payments schedule, the 
engineer’s baseline estimates of the unit prices (if applicable), the percentage cut-off values and 
discount rate. 
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Cattell et al (2007), in reviewing the various models suggested for use by bidders, have been 
particularly critical of the arbitrary nature of the cut-off values as, “despite their significance, it is 
commonly recommended that they should be decided upon without any scientific or 
mathematical aid”.  Of course, the real problem here is that there is no data available to enable 
such a scientific aid to be developed for, as noted earlier, the risks involved in unbalancing are 
such that it is not in the interests of anyone involved to admit to the practice.  In fact, the lack of 
any real data on the nature and extent of unbalancing in practice in the industry raises 
fundamental questions concerning the efficacy or otherwise of any method aimed at detecting 
unbalanced bids that relies on existing price data. If, as is believed by many, the practice of 
unbalancing is indeed “virtually universal”, the baseline values themselves will be more 
representative of unbalanced bids than balanced bids.  Where the baseline values comprise the 
simple average unit price of the bids, and the majority of bids are unbalanced, the baseline figure 
itself will be equally unbalanced.  Likewise, even in the situation where the engineer’s estimate 
provides the baseline figure, an engineer continually and unknowingly exposed to unbalanced 
bids is unlikely to realise that they are indeed unbalanced and will instead treat them as balanced.  
In such a situation, therefore, it is likely that the unbalanced bids will appear to be balanced and 
the balanced bids appear to be unbalanced – outcomes termed type I and type II errors in 
statistical hypothesis testing, where a type I error is defined as the situation in which a correct 
hypothesis is inappropriately rejected while a type II error occurs when a false hypothesis is 
inappropriately retained. 
 
In this paper, we simulate the effects of these equivalent type I and II errors for situations where 
there are a few balanced bidders in a world of many unbalanced bidders.  Arditi & Chotibhong’s 
(2009) (A-C) detection system is used, with baseline values derived by two means: (1) their 
original method of averaging the unit prices provided by the bids for a single contract and (2) the 
use of a surrogate engineer’s estimate derived by averaging all unit prices for a database of 
previously bid contracts.  For the unbalancing process itself, we assume only FL is used and 
follow the deterministic method in also assuming each FL bidder knows the cut-off values for 
each unit price.  The resulting profit levels and rejection rates are provided for both FL and 
balanced bidders and which show that, under the conditions assumed, the type I and type II 
errors increase significantly as the proportion of FL to balanced bidders increases – with the FL 
7 
 
bidders gaining substantial profit at the expense of the balanced bidders and the balanced bidders 
being increasingly (mis)identified as unbalanced.  Sensitivity analysis confirms the results to be 
robust for a range of bidders, averaging methods, cut-off values, discount rates and cost and 
estimating variability. 
 
Notice that construction work is of such a nature that the costs that contractors incur, building the 
same item of work, are not identical, even though the specification of the item is prescribed. 
Furthermore, contractors have to estimate these costs when pricing their work, and there’s an 
inherent inaccuracy in these estimates. Beeston (1975) noted that the variance between 
contractors’ prices for component items is substantially more than the variance between their 
composite bids for overall projects.  These underlying variances in costs and in estimating 
accuracy are shown, in this simulation, to be substantial contributors to the misidentification of 
both balanced and unbalanced bids. 
 
 
Model 
 
Based on Cattell et al (2008), the profit present value is given by 
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For unbalanced bidding, ip is a strategic value which may or may not be a function of  ic′  and 
im  depending on how the detection cut-off value is derived.  In the deterministic situation, the 
optimal value of ip  is the cut-off value provided by the detection method in use – where =ip
the maximum cut-off value for those items that occur early in the project and =ip the minimum 
cut-off value for those items that occur later in the project. [Martin, is this a problem with the 
conversion from docx at my end, that there are multiple and conflicting references to pi – for both 
min and max?] 
 
 
SIMULATION STUDY 
 
Standard model 
 
For the purposes of the simulation study, a standard model was adopted.  This is for a single 
contract comprising Gates’ (1967) four items as shown in Table 13.  To these were added a 
notional mean actual cost( )
ic
µ , mean mark-up value( )
im
µ , payment date ( )iy , and the standard 
deviations of actual cost( )
ic
σ , estimated cost( )
ic
σ ′  and mark-up( )
im
σ .  The payment schedule 
indicates the year in which payment for the item is due so, for example, a value of 0 indicates 
payment is due immediately, while a value of 0.5 indicates payment is due midyear, etc. 
 
Also for the standard model, 10 bidders are assumed and a 15% discount rate ( )15.0=ir .  The 
Texas DOT cut-off criteria apply. That is, a range of 100% above or 50% below the baseline for 
major items, and 200% above or 75% below the baseline values for minor items, with major 
items being defined as items that cost more than 5% of the contract value (Arditi & Chotibhong 
2009: 724).  For the standard model, the baseline value of an item for a contract was represented 
by the average unit price for that item for that contract. 
 
                                                 
3 This is to be compared to real-world conditions, where a project might comprise thousands of items. 
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A simulation run consisted of 10,000 simulations of this single contract.  Therefore, for the 
contract 1, the value of bidder 1’s actual cost for item 1 was simulated by a random number 
generated from N( 50000=µ , =σ 5000) and estimated cost also from N( 50000=µ , =σ 5000), 
with a mark-up from N( 10=µ , =σ 5).  This was repeated for all 10 bidders for contract 1.  This 
whole process was repeated again for the remaining 9,999 contracts. 
 
An FL unbalanced bid was therefore simulated as follows: 
1. A set of 10 balanced bids for contract 1 was simulated for the standard model as above 
2. The average price was calculated for the 10 balanced bids for item 1 for this contract 
3. The engineer’s estimate was set as the value of 2 above 
4. The Texas cut-off was then calculated for item 1 based on the value of 3 above 
5. 2-4 was repeated for each of the remaining items 
6. To maximise profit by FL unbalancing, bidder 1’s unit prices were reset to the maximum 
cut-off for the early schedule items and minimum cut-off for the later schedule items. 
7. The average price was recalculated for the 9 balanced bids and 1 unbalanced bid for item 
1 for this contract and steps 3-7 above were repeated for each bidder until convergence. 
For multiple FL bidders, steps 2-7 above were repeated for each bidder until convergence. 
 
 
PV profit and rejection rates 
 
The present value profit was calculated for each bidder and each contract for the standard model.  
This is the difference between the item price and item actual cost discounted by the 15% 
discount rate.  Fig 1a shows the results for the standard model for the FL bidders in the presence 
of 0(1)10 FL bidders (the result where ‘number of FL bidders’=0 is the PV profit for the 
balanced bidders).  This indicates a steady increase in PV profit for the FL bidders as their 
numbers increase.  The PV profit for the balanced bidders remains constant irrespective of the 
number of FL bidders.  However, this is not the case for the rejection rates.  Of course, being a 
deterministic model, the rejection rate for the FL bidders is zero, as they are assumed to know 
the cut-off values and therefore have no risk of exceeding them.  The balanced bidders, on the 
other hand, increasingly exceed the cut-off values as shown in Fig 1b.  This indicates the 
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percentage of bids made by a balanced bidder in which at least one item exceeds the cut-off 
value for that item.  As is shown, upon reaching the point where there are eight FL out of the ten 
bidders, all of the balanced bidders are incorrectly identified as unbalanced. 
 
 
Sensitivity 
 
Several sensitivity tests were carried out to assess the robustness of these results.  Firstly, the 
standard model was modified from 10 bidders to a number of bidders ranging from two to 10.  
Figs 2a and 2b give the results, showing that the effect is greater where smaller number of 
bidders is involved both in terms of FL bidder profit and balanced bidder (mis)detection rate.  
Next the cut-off was changed systematically from the Texas method used in the standard model 
to a simple ±20(10)100% to include Wang (±30%) and Arditi & Chotibhong’s (±20-25%) 
values.  This also has an increased effect of the FL bidders’ profit, depending on the number of 
FL bidders involved (Fig 3a).  The mis(detection) rate for the balanced bidders, however, is less 
uniform with the rate reducing with larger cut-off percentages where less FL bidders are 
involved and increasing with a change in  profile where more FL bidders are involved (Fig 3b). 
 
Increasing the discount rate, as expected, has the effect of increasing FL bidder profit but with no 
effect at all on the (mis)detection rate (Figs 4a and 4b).  Figs 5a and 5b show the effects of 
changing the variability of the costs and estimated costs, with a reduced FL profit where there is 
greater variability but a relatively greater (mis)detection rate where there are fewer FL bidders 
involved and less where there are more FL bidders involved. 
 
Finally, a surrogate engineer’s baseline value was used in comparison with the average bid 
method.  To do this, a surrogate value was used of the average unit price of items in the database 
of 10,000 contracts as follows: 
1. A set of balanced bids for all 10,000 contracts was simulated as previously described 
2. The average unit price was calculated for item 1 for the n lowest overall bidders for each 
contract for all contracts 
3. The engineer’s estimate was set as the value of 2 above 
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4. The Texas cut-off was then calculated for item 1 based on the value of 3 above 
5. 2-4 was repeated for each item 
6. To maximise profit, bidder 1’s unit prices were reset to the maximum cut-off for the early 
schedule items and minimum cut-off for the later schedule items. 
7. 2-6 above was repeated until convergence as before. 
8. Again, for multiple FL bidders, steps 2-7 above were repeated for each bidder until 
convergence. 
 
Figs 6a and 6b show the results of using the surrogate engineer’s baseline value when using the 
data for the lowest bidder (EE1) and the averaged data for the lowest three bidders (EE3), 
showing that the FL bidder profit reduces slightly as more bidder’s data is used to average the 
surrogate engineer’s estimate, while the (mis)detection rate increases as more data is used. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The practice of bid unbalancing seems to have originated a long time ago, being reported as 
“flagrant” even before the 1920s.  Since Gates’ (1967) enunciation of the steps involved in 
unbalancing, followed by Stark’s (1972) LP formulation, several researchers have proposed 
means of better systemising the process to the point of automation.  Likewise, work on 
systemising its detection also seems to be reaching a similar point.  Meanwhile, empirical work 
on establishing the frequency of actual unbalancing has been limited to very few small samples – 
making the methods of detection of doubtful value as there appears to be no way of knowing 
whether the methods actually detect, or fail to detect, unbalanced bids when they are really 
unbalanced, or falsely detect unbalanced bids when they are really balanced. 
 
The study reported in this paper aimed to demonstrate the results of using a typical method of 
detection under some simple assumptions, such as that most unit prices are unbalanced and 
therefore methods that use existing unit prices to test for unbalancing are biased.  To do this, 
both FL unbalancing methods and their detection methods have been extended to become fully 
automatic and then tested under deterministic, simulated conditions. 
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The results show that, as expected, the balanced bids are often incorrectly detected by the Texas 
DOT method as unbalanced, with the rate of (mis)detection increasing with the proportion of FL 
bidders in the auction.  It is also shown that, while the profit for balanced bidders remain the 
same irrespective of the number of FL bidders involved, the FL bidder’s profit increases with the 
greater proportion of FL bidders present in the auction.  Sensitivity tests show that the 
(mis)detection rate increases further where there are fewer bidders in the auction and where more 
data is averaged to determine the baseline value, but also being smaller or larger with increased 
cut-off values and increased cost and estimate variability depending on the number of FL bidders 
involved.  The FL bidder’s profit, on the other hand, increases where there are fewer bidders in 
the auction, where the cut-off rate and discount rate is increased, where there is less variability in 
the costs and their estimates, and less data is used in setting the baseline values.  Also, the nature 
of the situation in construction procurement bidding is that much of the variability involved is 
generally considered to be due to roughly symmetrical “errors” in prediction and therefore lends 
itself to modelling by the normal, lognormal or beta-looking distributions.  With the variances 
involved, it is not expected that the results are sensitive to this. 
 
This simulation is focussed on the misinterpretation of balanced bids as unbalanced bids in a 
deterministic setting.  In real-world conditions, where bidders have no knowledge of the method 
or of the extent to which any detector will impose limits when testing their bid, it is hypothesised 
that, equally, unbalanced bids will be misinterpreted as balanced bids. This is yet to be tested 
however and needs to be addressed in future work.  Similarly, the four items from Gates’ early 
work on unbalancing, while providing a simple and easy to understand example of the basic 
issues involved, need to be extended to a treatment of a more real-world situation containing 
many more such items.  Further work is therefore also needed to develop this aspect in a more 
comprehensive and realistic setting. 
 
Meanwhile, the results to date caution against the use of untested methods for detecting strategic 
bidding such as unbalancing.  If, as Stark asserts, unbalanced bidding is “virtually universal” 
then a balanced bid, if such exists, is likely to look strange.  In the words of Rousseau (1756: 91), 
“to be sane in a world of madmen is itself a kind of madness”.  
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Item 1=i  2=i  3=i  4=i  
Description Clearing Earth excavation Rock excavation Cleaning up 
Unit Lump sum Cubic yards Cubic yards Lump sum 
Quantity ( )iq  1 50,000 25,000 1 
Mean actual unit cost 
( )
ic
µ  50,000 1.50 3.00 50,000 
Actual cost sd ( )
ic
σ  5,000 0.15 0.3 5,000 
Estimated cost sd ( )
ic
σ ′  5,000 0.15 0.3 5,000 
Mark-up mean ( )
im
µ  10% 10% 10% 10% 
Mark-up sd ( )
im
σ  5 5 5 5 
Payment due ( )iy  0 0.5 0.5 1 
Table 1: Gates’ four item contract 
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Fig 1b: Avg detection rate for balanced bidder (standard model)
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Fig 2a: Number of bidders effect
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Fig 2a: Number of bidders effect
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Fig 3a: Cut-off effect
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Fig 3b: Cut-off effect
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Fig 4a: Effect of discount rate
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Fig 4b: Discount rate effect
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Fig 5a: Standard deviation effect
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Fig 5b: Standard deviation effect
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Fig 6a: Detection method effect
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Fig 6b: Detection method effect
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